

# **EXHIBIT 63**

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
ATLANTA DIVISION

DONNA CURLING, ET AL., )  
                               )  
Plaintiffs,                 )  
                               ) Civil Action  
vs.                         )  
                               ) No. 1:17-CV-2989-AT  
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, ET AL., )  
                               )  
Defendants.                 )

VIRTUAL VIDEOTAPED 30(b)(6) DEPOSITION OF  
FULTON COUNTY BOARD OF REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS  
THROUGH  
DERRICK GILSTRAP  
Friday, January 21, 2022  
11:40 a.m.

Robin K. Ferrill, CCR-B-1936, RPR

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1 computer or other device, what have you, is air  
2 gapped. Is that right?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. What components of Georgia's current  
5 election system as used in Fulton County are air  
6 gapped as a matter of policy?

7 A. According to my understanding of air  
8 gapped, I'm saying all components are.

9 Q. Okay. As a matter of practice, is it any  
10 different? You can have a policy to have something  
11 one way and then in practice, maybe corners are cut  
12 or things are a little different to make things  
13 easier. So I'm asking -- I understand you to say as  
14 a matter of policy, all components of Georgia's  
15 current election system as used in Fulton County are  
16 air gapped. I'm asking if that's any different in  
17 practice?

18 A. No different in practice.

19 Q. Are there certain efforts that Fulton  
20 County has to make to ensure that those components  
21 remain air gapped?

22 A. No, not to my knowledge.

23 Q. Okay. Where does the voting equipment come  
24 from?

25 A. The voting equipment comes from Dominion

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1 with election night reporting software on it, also in  
2 the possession of Fulton County?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Okay. How do the results get from the  
5 tabulation server to the ENR computer?

6 A. It is given to me by Mr. Olomo and I take  
7 it and place it into the designated computer.

8 Q. And what is "it"?

9 A. The -- it's a USB drive. A thumb drive.

10 Q. So the USB drive is inserted into the  
11 tabulation server?

12 A. Yes, it is inserted into the tabulation  
13 server. Once it's inserted into the tabulation  
14 server, the file, the election night reporting file  
15 is copied onto that USB drive. And then once it's  
16 copied, it's taken from -- from the server to the  
17 designated computer whereby we log in to election  
18 night reporting and upload the results from that.

19 Q. Thank you. That USB drive that's inserted  
20 into the tabulation server, does that come from the  
21 Georgia Secretary of State?

22 A. Yes, it does. It came -- it came when we  
23 received the equipment.

24 Q. But is it used for any other purpose?

25 A. No, it's not used for any other purpose.

1           Q.    Okay.  And what happens to it after it's  
2 inserted into the ENR computer again?

3           A.    Once it's -- once we -- once we transfer  
4 the results to the Secretary of State, that -- all  
5 files on that USB are deleted and then that thumb  
6 drive is reformatted to be used again.

7           Q.    So after the results are transferred out  
8 from the ENR computer to the Secretary of State, the  
9 USB drive is reformatted so it can be used again.  
10 Did I hear that right?

11          A.    Not for that election.

12          Q.    Okay.

13          A.    We would never use it for that election,  
14 but as far as moving forward.

15          Q.    Okay.  So Fulton County holds onto the  
16 reformatted thumb drive or is it sent somewhere else?

17          A.    No, it would be still in our possession.

18          Q.    What would it be used for?  If you don't  
19 mind my asking.

20          A.    I mean, it would never be used again until  
21 it's been -- all files have been deleted and it's  
22 been reformatted.  And then it could be used -- it  
23 could be used as far as to load -- as a thumb drive,  
24 we may load it with a file to load the BMD -- our  
25 project onto the BMDs or something like that.  Or it

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1 can be used -- once it's deleted and reformatted, it  
2 can be used again as far as to -- to load results to  
3 be used for ENR again on another election day.

4 Q. What about software updates?

5 A. No, not -- no. None of our -- none of our  
6 removable media has ever been used for software  
7 updates.

8 Q. How do software updates happen? If there's  
9 a better way to ask that. Do the election system  
10 components Fulton County has sometimes need software  
11 updates?

12 A. No, not to my knowledge. I mean, if  
13 there's a software update, I'm pretty sure that it  
14 will come from -- we will be notified by the  
15 Secretary of State.

16 Q. How would that work?

17 A. Well, basically more than likely notify the  
18 director and then we would be notified on how the  
19 process would be taking place.

20 Q. Can you give me an example of a software  
21 update where the Secretary of State notified Fulton  
22 County that it needed to take place?

23 A. Yes. We had one -- we have only had one  
24 and that was done in October of 2020. But we were  
25 notified that -- we were notified that all of the

1 equipment, and all the equipment is functioning  
2 properly.

3 Q. And Fulton County follows the Secretary of  
4 State's Office's instructions for how to perform  
5 logic and accuracy testing. Is that right?

6 A. Yes, we do.

7 Q. So Fulton County would not have the  
8 authority to alter those instructions or the  
9 performance of logic and accuracy testing, I suppose,  
10 if it thought it needed to be changed in any way?

11 A. No, we would not.

12 Q. Mr. Gilstrap, are you aware of any reports  
13 or findings or conclusions regarding any potential or  
14 actual security concerns, breaches or vulnerabilities  
15 having to do with Georgia's current election system?

16 A. No, not to my knowledge.

17 Q. Do you have any reason to think that your  
18 knowledge would differ from that of Fulton County on  
19 whose behalf you are testifying here today?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Are you aware of any reports or findings or  
22 conclusions regarding any potential or actual  
23 security concerns, breaches or vulnerabilities  
24 regarding Georgia's prior election system?

25 A. Not -- not that I can think of. No.

1 A. No.

2 Q. Are you relying on any other sources for  
3 your testimony about topic 15?

4 A. No.

5 Q. And I can see in reading topic 15, that it  
6 mentions removable media used with the system in  
7 subsection b, wireless connections involving any  
8 components of the election system in subsection c.  
9 And we have touched on these topics a little bit  
10 already today. Is that right?

11 A. Yes, we have.

12 Q. Okay. I'll try not to plow too much in the  
13 way of new earth then, but I do have a few questions  
14 here. So first off, tell me about any  
15 vulnerabilities which Fulton County is aware  
16 involving the security, integrity, reliability or  
17 accuracy of Georgia's current Election System as used  
18 in Fulton County. What do you know?

19 A. I don't know of any. None, to my  
20 knowledge.

21 Q. Are you familiar with a term "cyber attack  
22 vulnerable"?

23 A. A little.

24 Q. What do you know about it?

25 A. I'm thinking cyber attack, I'm thinking

1 securing components of the election system when they  
2 are stored overnight at early voting locations? Are  
3 there policies that Fulton County uses to secure that  
4 equipment?

5 A. To be honest, beyond the policy that I'm  
6 aware of in regards to storing equipment overnight in  
7 the early voting polling places, would be making sure  
8 the equipment is locked, making sure that it is --  
9 all equipment is sealed. Each and every night after  
10 early voting site is closed, it is required that they  
11 seal all equipment. That's --

12 Q. Mr. Gilstrap, I'm sorry I interrupted you.  
13 Please continue.

14 A. I was just going to say that's all I have.

15 Q. Mr. Gilstrap, in preparing for your  
16 testimony and in preparing for your testimony today,  
17 have you read any of the expert reports filed in this  
18 litigation?

19 A. No, I haven't.

20 Q. Are you familiar with Dr. Alex Halderman?

21 A. Not really. No, I'm trying to think if I  
22 heard that name.

23 Q. So you have heard the name, but you  
24 wouldn't say you are familiar with it?

25 A. I'm not familiar. I'm definitely not

1 familiar.

2 Q. Okay. Are you aware he's been hired as an  
3 expert on election security by the -- some of the  
4 plaintiffs in this case?

5 A. No, I'm not.

6 Q. Okay. So are you aware that he's analyzed  
7 voting equipment that's used in Georgia elections,  
8 and specifically I'm talking about the ICX electronic  
9 ballot-marking device and ICP scanner and the printer  
10 that's used in Georgia's elections to assess its  
11 reliability and security?

12 A. No, I'm not aware of that.

13 Q. Does Fulton County have the responsibility  
14 to address cyber attack vulnerabilities were they to  
15 be discovered in Georgia's election system  
16 components?

17 A. I'm pretty sure that we would notify the  
18 Secretary of State if something like that happened.  
19 That's the only thing that I could -- I could think  
20 of that would happen. If we had any inkling of a  
21 cyber attack or any type of vulnerability, that we  
22 would notify the Secretary of State and follow their  
23 lead in regards to that.

24 Q. So given that, does Fulton County have the  
25 authority to seek out cyber attack vulnerabilities

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1           A. Yes, I'm pretty sure. But like I say, I  
2 have no knowledge of that because we have never -- I  
3 have never -- we never had that situation.

4           Q. Okay. But does Fulton County look for  
5 cyber attack vulnerabilities in Georgia's election  
6 system components as they are used in Fulton County?

7           A. No, not -- not -- no.

8           Q. So they look for -- I'm sorry, go ahead.

9           A. I said no, not to my knowledge. No.

10          Q. Okay. So regarding cyber attack  
11 vulnerabilities, Fulton County looks to Georgia  
12 Secretary of State's Office for guidance? Is that  
13 right?

14          A. Yes, we do.

15          Q. And they would look to the Secretary of  
16 State's Office for guidance on implementing any  
17 measures that were necessary to address cyber attack  
18 vulnerabilities in Georgia's election system. Is  
19 that also right?

20          A. Yes.

21          Q. Okay. And to be clear with the disturbance  
22 earlier, Fulton County has not assessed or examined  
23 the Georgia election system for cyber attack  
24 vulnerabilities. Is that a correct statement?

25          A. Yes.

1           Q. And it follows that Fulton County is not  
2 taking any measures to eliminate or remediate any  
3 cyber attack vulnerabilities in the Georgia election  
4 system. Is that also right?

5           A. I think -- I mean, yes, that's correct. I  
6 mean, we -- yes.

7           Q. So if there were a significant  
8 vulnerability that were discovered, say, for example,  
9 that a BMD could be hacked in a way to alter QR codes  
10 so they don't reflect what the voter actually says,  
11 you would look to the Secretary of State's Office for  
12 guidance on that?

13          A. Yes, most definitely.

14          Q. And you would look to the Secretary of  
15 State's Office to remediate that vulnerability. Is  
16 that also right?

17          A. Yes.

18          Q. Regarding wireless connections involving  
19 components of Georgia's current election system, are  
20 you aware of any vulnerabilities related to  
21 low-security WiFi and how they affect those  
22 components generally?

23          A. With the KNOWINK poll pads, we do have to  
24 upload the file via WiFi. By being a statewide voter  
25 registration file, it is a pretty big file. Only

1       thing I can say is that it takes -- it takes quite a  
2       while to download each and every poll pad. But other  
3       than that, that's the only thing that we would have a  
4       wireless connection.

5           Q. With regard to that process regarding the  
6       downloading file for the poll pads, are you aware of  
7       any service security vulnerabilities related to that  
8       process?

9           A. I'm not aware of any. No, I'm not aware of  
10      any.

11          Q. Do you know who Angelos Keromytis is?

12          A. No, I don't.

13          Q. Is Fulton County aware of claims that  
14       someone made a successful hacking attempt into Fulton  
15       County voting machines via remote WiFi towards the  
16       end of 2020?

17          A. No, I don't know any -- I don't have any  
18       knowledge on that. I don't know anything about that.

19          Q. Are you aware of any other claims of access  
20       to Georgia election system components as used in  
21       Fulton County via wireless access?

22          A. No.

23          Q. Mr. Gilstrap, I'm going to back up for a  
24       moment and ask you to, if you are so designated, to  
25       talk about topic 13. I have just scrolled on

1           A.     None.

2           Q.     Did you review any documents to prepare to  
3 testify about this topic?

4           A.     No.

5           Q.     Did you also speak with Mr. Olomo,  
6 Ms. Williams and the county attorney to prepare to  
7 testify about topic 16?

8           A.     Yes.

9           Q.     And those were the two sessions that we  
10 have discussed throughout the day?

11          A.     Yes.

12          Q.     Did you speak with anyone else to prepare  
13 to testify about topic 16?

14          A.     No.

15          Q.     Are you relying on any other sources for  
16 your testimony about topic 16?

17          A.     No.

18          Q.     Do you know of any voting data, copies or  
19 images of voting equipment used in Fulton County for  
20 2020 and 2021 elections that was taken or received by  
21 third parties?

22          A.     No, not to my knowledge.

23          Q.     Had a third party taken copies or images of  
24 voting equipment used in those elections or voting  
25 data in those elections, would that be a concern to

1 Fulton County?

2 A. Yes, I would think so.

3 Q. And why would you think so -- excuse me,  
4 why would Fulton County think so? Is a better way.

5 A. I mean -- I mean, any -- I mean, as far as  
6 personally, any data -- I mean, I'm -- I just believe  
7 that all data -- all data, it should be discreet and  
8 secure, I mean, unless it is authorized to be given.

9 Q. If a third party took or received data or  
10 copies or images of equipment as described in this  
11 topic, would that violate cybersecurity policies that  
12 Fulton County uses in its elections?

13 A. I don't know. I can't answer that. I  
14 have -- I have no knowledge of that. I can't answer  
15 that.

16 Q. Is that because Fulton County follows  
17 Secretary of State guidance on such security  
18 policies?

19 A. Yes, I mean, yes, we -- definitely, we  
20 would follow -- we would alert Secretary of State and  
21 follow their -- their response to that.

22 Q. And I understand you to say that you are  
23 not aware of any such incidents as described here.  
24 Am I understanding correctly?

25 A. Yes.

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1 put it up on the screen as well. All right. And  
2 here's Exhibit 5. It's about three pages consisting  
3 of an e-mail thread from June 9th, 2020, if you want  
4 to take a moment and review it.

5 A. Okay. I reviewed it.

6 Q. Okay. Do you know what election protection  
7 is?

8 A. No, I don't know exactly -- no, I don't  
9 know. I don't know.

10 Q. Sure. I'll represent to you that it's a  
11 nonpartisan organization that often acts to assist  
12 voters during elections, ensuring that registered  
13 voters eligible to vote are able to get their ballots  
14 cast. So this is an e-mail sent in to Fulton County  
15 and Secretary of State personnel on June 9th,  
16 regarding problems they reported this morning and  
17 there's a number of problems further down the list  
18 that were recorded. You can see right here at the  
19 8:20 a.m. e-mail towards the bottom of the Page 2 of  
20 the exhibit, about Thicket Elementary, 11 C, has  
21 extremely long lines, was reported did not open  
22 either. Do you see that?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. Sure. And then down on Page 3, there's  
25 some additional precincts about which election

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1 protection, this author of the e-mail, claims to have  
2 received concerning, quote, locations are not open  
3 and that there were no machines and voters are not  
4 being given paper ballots at a couple of the  
5 additional locations. Do you see that as well?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. Right. So is it fair to describe some of  
8 the problems with precinct openings and the  
9 unavailability of emergency paper ballots on June 9th  
10 as execution or operational issues or challenges for  
11 Georgia's election system?

12 A. Yes, from these e-mails, yes.

13 Q. And how did Fulton County go about  
14 attempting to resolve these problems and any others  
15 like them in the June 2020 primary?

16 A. If it was a technical issue, then -- and if  
17 it was reported to the -- to the election preparation  
18 center, we would contact the poll manager and make  
19 sure that -- that the equipment is working correctly.  
20 I know I'm looking at some of these things as they  
21 are logistics, which I am not over logistics, in  
22 regards to making sure that the -- I'm not over the  
23 delivery of the equipment. I'm not over as far as  
24 paper ballots are at the location on election day.  
25 So I couldn't -- I couldn't respond to these at the

1 time.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. This is the first time I saw these e-mails.

4 Q. Well, I understand this may be the first  
5 time you have seen some of these e-mails. Is it the  
6 first time you have been made aware of these problems  
7 from the June 2020 primary?

8 A. I know I was aware of the -- the long lines  
9 and precincts not opening. I'm not -- I was not  
10 aware of which precincts right offhand. If I was  
11 called with a -- if a -- situation where the -- where  
12 they were having problems with the equipment, then my  
13 staff would troubleshoot, and if we couldn't handle  
14 it over the phone, then we could go to a particular  
15 polling place and make sure all the voting equipment  
16 was working properly and the poll is up and running.

17 Q. When you say "we," do you mean Fulton  
18 County election employees --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- or --

21 A. I mean Fulton County election technicians.

22 Q. Election technicians. And these are  
23 distinct from Dominion or KNOWiNK technicians that we  
24 have talked about earlier?

25 A. Yes. Now, if it was a KNOWiNK situation

1 with a poll pad, we did have KNOWINK technicians on  
2 hand that went out to those locations that had poll  
3 pad issues. Other than that, it was mainly -- well,  
4 for this election, we did have Dominion techs that  
5 also went out when we had issues with equipment.  
6 This was the primary.

7 Q. Yes. What kind of issues? Go ahead.

8           A.     We have issues with -- we have issues with  
9     BMD or a scanner, if we had those issues, and we had  
10    a Dominion tech in the warehouse on election day,  
11    we -- we -- we would have sent them to that site,  
12    including with our own techs from Fulton County.  
13    Mainly, the techs, they work with logic and accuracy  
14    testing.

15 Q. Sure. Of course, this is happening after  
16 the logic and accuracy testing and once the election  
17 is running, correct?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. Okay. There should be an Exhibit 6 in your  
20 marked exhibits file now, Mr. Gilstrap. You may want  
21 to refresh and pull it up. I'll also put it up on  
22 the screen.

23 (Exhibit 6, E-mail string to Germany and  
24 other from Houk, 8/11/2020, Bates stamped  
25 State-Defendants-00110732 - 00110734, marked for

1 identification.)

2 Q. (By Mr. Sparks) And this is another  
3 three-page e-mail just to read. My question concerns  
4 the e-mail starting on Page 2.

5 A. Okay. I read it.

6 Q. Yes. So on Page 2, Attorney Houk, who you  
7 can see in the first paragraph of this e-mail to  
8 Mr. Germany and Mr. Harvey. First paragraph talks  
9 about the lawyers committee convening the national  
10 election protection program. The second paragraph  
11 concerns voting machines, poll pad issues in Floyd,  
12 Chatham, Fulton and Gwinnett Counties. Quote, Some  
13 of the reports indicate a problem with "decoders"  
14 that are preventing the printing of ballot access  
15 cards or other machine-related issues. And you can  
16 see that the date of this e-mail is August 11, 2020,  
17 correct?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. So this was the primary runoff in 2020,  
20 right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. Can you tell me anything more about  
23 this asserted problem with poll pad issues in Fulton  
24 County concerning decoders?

25 A. With poll pad issues concerning decoders,

1       this was -- it was not a major issue. I know with  
2       those decoders, they have -- any pull or tug to the  
3       cord can easily pull it out of the poll pad. Once  
4       it's reinserted and established again, it works -- it  
5       works just fine. From my recollection of the issue,  
6       it was a very minor issue. We was able to -- to let  
7       the poll manager know to make sure the -- that  
8       nothing is pulling the cord from the decoders and,  
9       also, make sure that they're all the way pushed in  
10      and connected properly and so once you put in the  
11      voter access card, it will be able to work. It will  
12      create the card. I cannot recollect if we had -- we  
13      had to send a KNOWiNK tech out to any of these sites,  
14      but from my recollection, it wasn't a major issue in  
15      our county.

16           Q. And who was first up to deal with problems  
17      like this with the poll pads as they were reported?  
18      Was that Fulton County? Was that KNOWiNK? Was that  
19      the Secretary of State's Office, or was it someone  
20      else or a combination of these?

21           A. Well, you'd see, like I had said before,  
22      usually they have a dashboard, the Secretary of State  
23      and KNOWiNK, so even before we find out that a  
24      situation is being -- it's been reported, they know.  
25      They alert KNOWiNK, the Secretary of State does, and

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1       then KNOWINK alerts the technician in that county.  
2       Once he's there alerting the county, they sometimes  
3       contact the poll manager if you haven't already found  
4       out about the situation, they contact them. They  
5       contact the poll manager and if there's a serious  
6       problem that they cannot handle on the phone, they go  
7       out to the site and the problem.

8           Q.     So sometimes even when it's the county  
9       technician or the poll manager that addresses the  
10      problem on the ground, the first notice of the  
11      problem and/or what to do about it will actually come  
12      from the vendor or the Secretary of State's Office?

13          A.     Yes. There's the dashboard that is -- that  
14      is around election day that the county do not have  
15      privilege of seeing, that -- of all the polling  
16      places that basically KNOWINK provides poll pads to,  
17      and if it's a poll pad issue, it can definitely be  
18      notified before we find out about it.

19          Q.     When you say the dashboard, is that  
20      something set up by KNOWINK?

21           A better question might be is the dashboard  
22      setup to or accessible by Fulton County?

23          A.     No. We wish we could access the dashboard  
24      but we are not able to.

25          Q.     Is that still true today?

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1 A. That is true through today.

2 Q. So for the next upcoming election in 2022,  
3 Fulton County won't have access to a dashboard like  
4 that?

5 A. As of the present time, we do not have  
6 access to those dashboards.

7 Q. Have problems like this one that's  
8 described with the decoder, have they occurred since  
9 the August 11th election in 2020?

10 A. Yes, they have.

11 Q. Can you tell me how often and generally  
12 whether that's frequent or occasional or almost never  
13 or always?

14 A. I would say occasional.

15 Q. Occasional?

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 MR. SPARKS: Take that down. All right.

18 Now I just added what's been marked as Exhibit 7  
19 to your marked exhibits file as well,  
20 Mr. Gilstrap. I'll try to pull it up here.

21 (Exhibit 7, E-mail string to Brower and  
22 others from Cummings, 10/22/2020, Bates stamped  
23 State-Defendants-00169113 - 00169114, marked for  
24 identification.)

25 Q. (By Mr. Sparks) All right. This is a

1 two-page e-mail thread. If you could let me know  
2 when you have reviewed it.

3 A. Okay. I read it.

4 Q. Okay. Do you recognize this e-mail,  
5 Mr. Gilstrap?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. And that's your e-mail address on some, but  
8 not all, of the e-mails in the thread, correct?

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. Okay. And so you see that this e-mail  
11 thread is about a ballot that printed with two QR  
12 codes on it?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, had you heard of that issue prior to  
15 receiving this e-mail in October of 2020?

16 A. No, I hadn't heard of that issue prior to  
17 receiving -- I received the call from the election  
18 site in the early voting election site. And that was  
19 the first that I heard of the double QR code. At  
20 that present time, I reached out to the Secretary of  
21 State and the Center of Election Systems about the  
22 issue. They said they were going to call me back,  
23 but they never did. I then reached out to the  
24 election chief at that time, Mr. Dwight Brower, and  
25 let him know the situation. And also, Ms. Benjamin,

1 who was my -- who was the supervisor at the time, and  
2 also she was over early voting, she's over early  
3 voting. And told them I'm waiting on the Secretary  
4 of State to get back with me with the resolution to  
5 the situation. Once I didn't get a resolution,  
6 that's when I contacted the poll manager for that  
7 early voting site and let them know what was  
8 happening. And that's when, the next day, they  
9 e-mailed Mr. Brower to try to find out because the  
10 voter -- the voter was waiting on a response. And  
11 that's when Mr. Brower e-mailed Michael Barnes who is  
12 the director of the center of election systems and  
13 from the e-mail, he reached out to Dominion and  
14 that's where he got the response there in this  
15 e-mail.

16 Q. Yes, I see Mr. Barnes's response here  
17 regarding what Dominion has told us, that when a  
18 voter enters a number of write-in selections, the BMD  
19 will produce a second QR code, and then he suspects  
20 that might be why this ballot held two. Do you see  
21 that?

22 A. Yes, uh-huh.

23 Q. And then Mr. Brower and Mr. Cummings each  
24 respond, Well, what about L&A? Shouldn't this be  
25 duplicated in L&A? And Mr. Collins said we have had

1       it happen at least once during L&A. So that means  
2       that wouldn't just be a one-off issue if it had  
3       happened before, correct?

4           A. Well, at the present time, I didn't -- I  
5       had no -- I was not notified that it did happen at  
6       L&A. And I was not in that conversation about the  
7       double QR code. So I did not -- did not see it in  
8       L&A. Mr. Cummings said he had discussed it with  
9       Dominic. So from his -- from the e-mail, this  
10      e-mail, it did happen at least once during L&A.

11       Q. So it follows that L&A didn't necessarily  
12      prevent this incident from occurring. If it happened  
13      once then but also happened again during advanced  
14      voting, correct?

15       A. Yes.

16       Q. Has Fulton County sought to alter or change  
17      its L&A procedures in any way as a result of this  
18      incident?

19       A. No. No, we still go by the procedures that  
20      are -- that are the policies and procedures of the  
21      State of Georgia and the Secretary of State's Office.  
22      If a situation like this comes about, we take it to  
23      the Secretary of State or if any type of irregular  
24      situation. I know once I -- once I found out about  
25      it, that's exactly where I go with the situation. I

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1 ask them, do they know anything about it and what's  
2 the resolution to this situation?

3 Q. So straight to the Secretary of State then?

4 A. Yes.

5 MR. SPARKS: Could we go off the record for  
6 a moment, please.

7 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 5:03 p.m.

8 We are off the record.

9 (WHEREUPON, a recess was taken.).

10 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 5:13 p.m.

11 We are on the record.

12 Q. (By Mr. Sparks) Thank you for bearing with  
13 us, Mr. Gilstrap, just a couple more questions. And  
14 these actually concern logic and accuracy testing. I  
15 wanted to ask if Fulton County, in elections for 2020  
16 and 2021, aside from the double QR code incident  
17 reflected in Exhibit 7 that we just read, aside from  
18 that one, has Fulton County found errors during logic  
19 and accuracy testing in elections in either of the  
20 preceding two years?

21 A. No other incidents that I can think of;  
22 that was the only one.

23 Q. Okay. So when I say "errors," to be clear,  
24 I don't just mean significant errors. Like, I don't  
25 know, an BMD catch on fire or something. That would

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1 C E R T I F I C A T E

2 STATE OF GEORGIA )  
3 ) ss.:  
4 FULTON COUNTY )  
5

6 I, Robin Ferrill, Certified Court Reporter  
7 within the State of Georgia, do hereby certify:

8 That Derrick Gilstrap, the witness whose  
9 deposition is hereinbefore set forth, was duly sworn  
10 by me and that such deposition is a true record of  
11 the testimony given by such witness.

12 I further certify that I am not related to  
13 any of the parties to this action by blood or  
14 marriage; and that I am in no way interested in the  
15 outcome of this matter.

16 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set  
17 my hand this 9th day of February, 2022.

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21  
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23  
24 ROBIN K. FERRILL, RPR  
25